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Abstract:   This paper traces laissez-faire back to its French roots, and in 
particular, to its origins as a political philosophy evoking an economic 
approach. Related to his visit to France in the 1760s and his personal 
contacts, we suggest that Adam Smith serves as the link between selected 
French thinkers and what after Smith’s Inquiry would be widely accepted as 
a quintessentially Anglo-Saxon tradition in economics. Exploring doctrine, 
we offer linkages between F. Quesnay, A. Turgot, J.J. Rousseau, and 
Smith’s ideas. Similarities in Smith’s understanding  and the French 
exponents regarding economic activity vis-a- vis a public sector are 
presented, along with what we characterize as their minor departures related 
to relative size and tasks of the public sector, agriculture policy, role of 
competition, taxation and expenditure, as well as  consumption by the 
wealthy.   
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The term “laissez-faire” is used freely in modern Economic Science as 
though it were just another awkwardly pronounced English language word.  
Such is far from the truth.  As the foreign origin of the word suggests, 
laissez-faire is rooted in the French language and this term connotes a 
philosophical movement in France that was in full swing in the second half 
of the 18th century.   This movement would not only provide some of the 
explosive fuel that fired the French Revolution of the late 1780s, but would 
also generate key ideas that would find their ways into the foundations of 
what later would be lionized—and also vilified—as an Anglo-Saxon 
tradition in Economic Science.    
How is it that the French term “laissez-faire” found its way into the 
English language?  More importantly, how is it that this French term would 
remain active, useful, descriptive, and continuously evocative for more than 
two centuries—as a familiar and still frequently used term found in 
contemporary text books describing much more than just an economic 
system of yore?    
We think this story deserving of consideration.  To begin we have to 
consider who we suggest is the likely link between the French and English 
philosophical worlds:  Adam Smith, a Scottish thinker of renown.  Of 
special interest to us is how it is that Smith initially came into contact with 
the term, the concepts, and principles of laissez-faire, and how it is that this 
term and its meanings were incorporated into his seminal and highly 
influential contributions to classical political economy, especially what is 
widely recognized as his masterwork, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes 
of the Wealth of Nations, first published in 1776.    
Biographers note Smith as a man of modest origins, borne into the 
world on the north bank of the Firth of Forth in the Scottish town of 
Kirkaldy in about 1723.  His formal education and academic career—though 
stellar—were limited to institutions based in Scotland and England.   It was 
after his studies that the highly educated Smith accepted a contract to tutor 
the young Duke of Baccleuch from years 1763 to 1766.   We think that this 
job and these few years provide the key piece to help us assemble the 
laissez-faire puzzle.    
In his Great Economists before Keynes, Mark Blaug (1986, pp. 233-
234) notes that Smith traveled with the young Duke to the Continent and to 
France, where he would meet with thinkers of the day: such as Francois 
Quesnay and Anne Robert Jacques Turgot, as well the philosophes  Jean 
Jacques Rosseau and Voltaire.    Robert Heilbroner (1999, pp. 49-50) 
suggests that  Smith spoke the French language “passably well”  and 
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developed a personal affinity for Quesnay to the degree that he almost 
dedicated his Inquiry to him.     
 
Origins of Laissez-Faire as a Philosophical Approach    
Quesnay, Turgot, and Rousseau emerged as exponents of ideas that would 
connect them with a cultural movement characterized  as an 
“enlightenment.”    Lionel Rothkrug (1965) traces the origins of the French 
Enlightenment, in particular, to popular  reactions and oppositions to 
policies Louis XIV, the late 17th century monarch.      
 Like Rothkrug we also view the French Enlightenment as a reaction 
to controlling institutions of the 17th and 18th centuries, and as a ground 
swell that would formidably challenge the monarchy and the Roman 
Catholic Church.   
With respect to the latter, the Enlightenment challenged views that 
had long been supported by doctrines and carried out in practices by the 
Church.  In his seminal Summa Theologica, 13th century scholastic Thomas 
Aquinas (1956, Vol II, p. 959)  notes in Question 83 “Of the Subject of 
Original Sin:” that the “… rebellion of the flesh against the mind arises from 
the corruption of original sin.”    In Aquinas’s influential view, human 
beings are also thought to be tempted by qualities inherent in their flesh to 
commit others sins, both venal and mortal.    Since human beings are born 
with original sin and then face temptation to commit other sins,   Aquinas— 
like Augustine  from whom he draws (Cantor, 1969) —recognizes the 
importance of  “redemption:”  what the Catholic Church, in particular,  
specialized in offering as the foundation for eternal life.       
As a departure from Church teachings exponents of the French -- as 
well as the broad based European Enlightenment -- promoted a seemingly 
radical position: namely that human beings were basically and inherently 
good.   Frank Manuel (1965, p. 5) notes that a moderated version of 
enlightenment opinion accepted that human beings were  “… at least capable 
of becoming good.”    
The enlightenment view purports that prominent and powerful social 
institutions—that would certainly include institutionalized religion as well as 
monarchy—prevented human beings from realizing their goodness.   With 
this perspective in mind, and as a way toward improve the inhibiting 
character of social institutions,   Enlightenment thinkers  purported a 
corollary: namely, that human being could live outside of the controls of 
these two institutions, and govern themselves.  In addition, enlightenment 
thinking—and especially in France—purported that human beings and 
society at large would more readily achieve higher goals of individual liberty 
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and personal freedom, as well as fraternity and equality: if economic activity 
were unfettered from the shackles of tradition held on to by the Church and 
the ancient institution of  monarchy.   
France’s monarchy, in particular,  was cited by Enlightenment 
thinkers for its influences on economic activity through economic policies 
generating economic outcomes.  In the second half of the 17th century during 
the reign of Louis XIV, a minister by the name of Jean Baptiste Colbert 
(1618-1683)  created and implemented a wide range of regulations often 
characterized as “mercantilist” to protect and attempt to foster agriculture 
and nascent industry.   As French historian Charles Cole (1943, p. 112) 
teaches us,  M. Colbert relied on “… a technique of encouraging industry by 
government support, by the granting of privileges, and by the extension of 
tariff protection….”  So powerful was Colbert and his interventionist 
approach that his legacy lives on and is evoked by the term Colbertisme, an 
Étatist  philosophy: and an -isme or  -ism  deemed  anathema to principles of 
modern economics based on private ownership of property, and allocation 
through markets tempered by forces of competition—what we as coauthors 
hold would later be characterized as a quintessential, Anglo Saxon economic 
view. 
 
Seminal Contributions to Laissez-Faire 
Quesnay in his Tableau Economique (1768), Turgot in his Reflections on the 
Formation and Distribution of Riches (1774), and Rousseau in his Discourse 
on Political Economy (1755) provides examples whereby public 
administration directly infringes on the functioning of markets via direct 
regulation, and indirectly via excessive taxation.   
Both Quesnay and Turgot were leaders in a movement known as 
“Physiocracy,” a school of thought emphasizing agricultural production, and 
with the soil as the sole generator of economic surplus taking the form of 
grain.  They advocated that the public sector’s influence in the agricultural 
economy should be minimized.   Many of Quesnay’s notes purporting a 
philosophy introduced by the term “laissez-faire” are found in his famous 
Tableau Economique, as critiques of public sector intervention in the 
agricultural economy of his day.   Turgot would establish himself as 
Minister of Finance, Trade and Public Works under Louis XVI, a position 
from which he could advocate extensive reforms that included abolishing 
monarchical restrictions on grain trade, dissolving of medieval guilds, as 
well as ending, as Blaug, (1986, p. 254) notes, the controversial corvée labor 
that was relied upon for public construction projects and road maintenance.   
Turgot promoted a policy shift:  whereby those laboring for public projects 
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would not be fulfilling corvée  feudal obligations, but would be compensated 
with  wage payments.  
 In short, Turgot advocated freeing up economic activity from 
centralized, public and monarchical influences.   Smith would have come 
into contact with Turgot toward the start of his tenure when he was 
employed as chief administrator for the District of Limoges  from years 
1761-1774 (Blaug, 1986, p. 254), some years before he began his more 
influential administrative posts. 
Rousseau is better known as a philosopher and a social critic than as 
an economic theorist.  He achieved both celebrity as well as notoriety in his 
day: especially for his Discourse on the Sciences and Arts (1750) and  his 
Discourse on the Origins of Inequality (1750).  Blaug (1986, p. 234) teaches 
us that Rousseau and Smith met in France.  In his lengthy autobiography, 
The Confessions (1781), Rousseau,  however,  fails to mention his contacts 
with Smith.  As much as Rousseau and Smith’s personal contacts remain 
neglected, the two, nevertheless, as we suggest below, articulated 
comparable opinions regarding taxation and economic regulation. 
 
Natural Law and Laissez-Faire 
Quesnay’s writings on natural laws of commerce serve as a useful starting 
point for our presentation.     Section Five of Quesnay’s Observations of the 
Natural Rights of Men United in Society (Le Droit Naturel) (1765) proposes 
that specific natural laws regulate commerce.   Quesnay claims that 
governments can and should institute “positive” or secular laws to ensure 
that “natural” laws are observed.  A nation’s prosperity, according to 
Quesnay, depends on its government’s ability to generate laws conforming 
with natural laws.   Quesnay mentions that many natural laws emphasize 
preservation of private property, and that an effective government should 
and is bound to defend an individual’s property.    In “Observation Five” of 
his famous Tableau, Quesnay refers to monopolies and surcharges as 
conditions in commerce that should be reduced to a necessary minimum by a 
public sector.   
About one decade later Smith would introduce suggested natural and 
commercial laws and note consequences of diverging from them.  In Chapter 
Seven of Book I of  his Inquiry, Smith (1952,  pp. 22-27) discusses the 
existence of natural rates for wages, profits, and rents.  These natural rates, 
in turn, affect and even serve to regulate – and with a degree of precision -- 
not only values of commodities, but also their supply to markets.   Price 
competition is suggested to prevent both shortages and surpluses.  According 
to Smith, therefore, markets efficiently regulate themselves through forces of 
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competition.  Similar to Quesnay, Smith writes of  external influences as 
interfering with a natural flow of commerce.  Smith (1952, pp. 233-234) 
notes in Chapter Six of Book IV of his Inquiry that allowing privileged 
trading status to organizations reduces competition, permitting such 
organizations to charge prices above natural prices.      In Chapter Nine of 
Book IV, Smith (1952, p. 300) suggests a commercial economy with limited 
governmental restraints: as a natural state of liberty in which people as 
agents are free to follow and pursue their noble interests that are suggested 
to generate desirable societal outcomes.  Smith’s view runs parallel to 
Quesnay’s conclusion:  that allowing natural laws of commerce to wield 
influence over markets would not only prove  fair, but would also prove 
beneficial to society.      
 
Turgot and Smith on Financial Markets and Government Expenditures 
Both Turgot and Smith reflected on the role of government in setting interest 
rates for money.  Smith’s opinions are not identical to Turgot’s, though we 
find a similar thrust.    
Turgot’s  Reflections were  published in 1793 almost twenty years 
after Smith’s Inquiry. However, as his title suggests, this work could well 
contain ideas held prior to Smith’s book, and from the time that he met with 
Smith.  Turgot (1971, pp. 92-93) argues in Section 76 that markets 
efficiently determine interest rates.  Turgot notes that demand for money 
fluctuates in a similar way that demand fluctuates for physical commodities.  
Thus he suggests there exists no greater reason to institutionally fix interest 
rates for money than it does to fix prices of commodities moving through 
markets.  Smith considers similar views, however, he introduces selected  
qualifications worth noting.     
Smith (1952, p. 154) suggests in Chapter Five of Book II of his 
Inquiry that interest rates could be set slightly above the lower range of 
market rates.  He adds that setting the interest rate for money either below or 
above the market rate, would eliminate usury and borrowing altogether.  
Heilbroner (1996, p. 196) considers in his Teachings from the Worldly 
Philosophy  that Smith supported the institutional establishment of ceilings 
on interest rates, making Smith less laissez-faire—so to speak—with regards 
to interest rates, compared to what was advocated in the writings of Turgot.  
 Turgot and Smith do, however, agree that taxing interest revenues 
would prove economically harmful.  In Section 76 of his Reflections, Turgot 
(1971, pp. 92-93) argues that a lender requires a stable return for the cost of 
his using money, and that taxing said return would lead a lender to charge a 
higher interest rate: what would serve to discourage borrowing.  Smith 
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(1952, pp. 372-374) makes the point in Chapter Seven of Book V of his 
Inquiry, that taxing interest on money tends to discourage investment in a 
nation, and consequently leads to reduced levels of employment and 
declining wages.  Both Smith and Turgot concur that taxing interest on 
money generates predictable, negative outcomes for an economy.  Smith and 
Turgot also comment regarding what they note as excessive public 
expenditures.   
 From his post as Minister of Finance and Trade and Public Works, 
Turgot stressed that the public sector should maintain a budget that balances 
expenditures with receipts.  Blaug (1986, p. 254) notes Turgot as “strict” 
regarding public expenditures.  Smith (1952, pp. 403-4)  stresses caution and 
even pessimism toward the use of public expenditures in general.  In Chapter 
Three of Book V of his Inquiry, Smith states that governments tend to be too 
indulgent in times of peace, and that governments also tend to run excessive 
deficits and accumulate debts during times of war.   While Smith claims that 
war related deficits might be justified, he suggests that governments are not 
sufficiently frugal in times of peace to offset wartime expenses.  Smith 
suggests that many European nations tend to perpetually run deficits that 
also generate ruinous outcomes.   
 
Toward a Common Agriculture Policy  
Turgot,  Quesnay, Rousseau—as well as Smith—seem to find common 
ground when considering agriculture and related policies.   
In Sections Two and Three of his Reflections,  Turgot (1971, pp. 3-5) 
explains that production and output derived from agriculture is associated 
with a lengthy and challenging process requiring significant labor inputs.  
Turgot’s claim regarding the arduous character of agricultural production 
suggests that it not be made even more challenging through poorly founded 
public sector policies.  In the “Fifth Observation” in his Tableau, Quesnay 
states that tariffs and tolls serve to diminish levels of revenues for a 
proprietor developing agricultural lands.  In Chapter Nine of Book V of his 
Inquiry,  Smith (1952, pp. 288-9) notes that policies restricting flows of 
agricultural production -- such as export constraints as well as taxes on 
transport -- discourage a nation’s agricultural development.  Smith refers to 
protectionist policies of M.Colbert. Though a man long since dead, Colbert’s 
tradition – in theory as well as in implemented policies  – posed as a nemesis 
to  Smith, Quesnay, and Turgot, especially when noting how trade 
regulations fetter economic activity.  Rousseau also sides with Smith and 
Turgot.  In A Discourse on Political Economy Political Economy,  Rousseau 
(1992, p. 166) refers to the relatively more productive English, Dutch and 
 7 
Chinese agricultural systems in which farmers have but light taxation 
burdens.  
 
Rousseau and Smith on Public Sector Growth 
Rousseau’s reflections suggest an approach to economics that is comparable 
to Smith’s,  though not always in agreement.  In his Discourse Rousseau 
(1992, pp. 162-163) also suggests that the state should assume duties such as 
defense and administration of justice, points articulated in Chapter One of 
Book V of Smith’s Inquiry.  Rousseau (1992, p. 163),  however,  voices 
greater skepticism than does Smith, especially regarding a state’s proclivity 
to increase in size and impose yet heavier tax burdens on its citizens.   
Rousseau (1969, p. 127) likewise expresses a general skepticism concerning 
civil life: namely, that civil life would not likely be supportive of human 
well being.   Rousseau (1992, p. 164) tends to associate expansion of a 
public sector as integral to exerting yet greater control over citizens, by 
making them poorer and more dependent on a centralized government.   
 Though skeptical of a public sector, Smith, nevertheless, fails to 
evoke the inherent skepticism of Rousseau.  Smith (1952, p. 315-357) 
suggests in Book V of his Inquiry that government assume a range of 
responsibilities and duties.   Heilbroner (1996, pp. 105-5) notes in his 
Teachings that Smith suggests that government is best suited to serve the 
public in areas such as regulation of banks, educating children and ensuring 
public health.  In contrast, in his Discourse Rousseau (1992, p. 163) claims 
that establishing public granaries is a viable excuse for raising taxes.    
However,  Rousseau (1992, p. 165) suggests that taxes should only be levied 
by public consent.  Smith seems to think of taxes as less taxing.  With these 
as differences, both Enlightenment thinkers agree that the wealthy, as well as 
public officials, are likely to manipulate markets in their own interests and 
for their own gain at the expense of the public.   
 
Smith and Rousseau on the Wealthy and on Public Funding 
Rousseau and Smith concur that governments are vulnerable to self interests 
of public administrators and influential individuals, and especially the 
wealthy.  Blaug (1986, pp. 234-5) refers to Smith’s assertion that 
businessmen will unite in their efforts to reduce market competition, and that 
legislatures tend to be untrustworthy.  In particular, Smith (1952, p. 199) 
refers to the harmful character trade restrictions impose between France and 
England.  In Chapter Three of Book IV of his Inquiry, Smith stresses that 
legislatures in their decisions are more likely directed by their petty interests 
than broader interests in  economic progress. In The Worldly Philosophers, 
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Heilbroner (1999, pp. 69-70) summarizes Smith’s expectations: that 
businessmen will seek to create monopolies that will also prevent members 
of society from purchasing goods at the lowest possible prices.   
Rousseau (1992, p. 162, 165)  succinctly claims that civil servants will 
emerge  biased toward their personal needs versus those needs of society, 
and that the wealthy will enjoy disproportionate political and social 
privileges for which they would confederate to defend.     
Rousseau and Smith agree that spending on luxuries could serve as a 
resource for public funding.  They both suggest several possible, beneficial 
outcomes from taxing luxury items.  Rousseau (1992, p. 168) proposes that 
taxing expensive commodities would encourage the wealthy to spend their 
money on more economically productive ends.  If such does not prove the 
case, then taxing would serve to raise money for the state treasury.  
According to Rousseau, the public would benefit from taxes in both cases.  
In Chapter Two of Book V of his Inquiry, Smith (1952, p. 384) claims that 
taxing luxury items discourages extravagance among the poor.  Smith 
suggests in this passage that demand for luxury items is, in essence, price 
elastic:  thus taxing luxury items should neither place an upward pressure on 
aggregate wages, nor serve to deter consumption, as would taxing 
necessities like food and clothing.   Both authors agree that public funds  
should neither be increased in a manner that unnecessarily burdens the 
poorest citizens, nor interferes with workmen’s wages and consumption.  
Taxing goods consumed by the wealthy are accepted both by Smith and 
Rousseau.   
 
Conclusion and Discussion 
This inquiry has noted several similarities between ideas of  Adam Smith, 
regarding his understanding of laissez-faire, and those of Françios Quesnay, 
Ann Robert Jacques Turgot, as well as Jean Jacques Rousseau. I would like 
to qualify that it remains beyond the scope and even the aim of this inquiry 
to boast to have established a direct and causal relationship between Smith’s 
visit to France and the later development of his ideas. However, I think that 
Smith’s noted ‘mingling’—as well as the commonality of thinking on 
several themes that were introduced—is certainly deserving of 
consideration, thoughtful pondering, and cautious conjecture.    
This research leads me to conclude that Smith appears more analytical 
and detailed than was Quesnay; that he partially disagrees with Turgot, 
especially regarding interest rates; and that he is more optimistic than 
Rousseau with respect to allowing a public sector assume a role in economic 
society.  Nevertheless, we are inclined to think of Smith’s differences as 
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minor departures,  and we would thus like to characterize Adam Smith as a 
Scottish exponent of French laissez-faire in his own right.   
We would like to note that since Smith came into contact with these 
exponents of the philosophy of laissez-faire while in France in the 1760s,  he 
would have had almost a full decade to reflect on their thought tradition.   
Since its publication in 1776,  Adam Smith’s Inquiry is widely recognized— 
not only as the most seminal of contributions to Classical Political Economy 
—but also as the foundation of modern Economic Science that was 
consolidated in Alfred Marshall’s Principles of Economics when it first 
appeared in 1890.  We are of the opinion that Smith’s master work would 
provide the intellectual cornerstone of what would later be appreciated as, 
thought of as, and boldly touted as:  a quintessentially Anglo-Saxon—but 
not as a French—tradition in Economic Science.   
Once John Stuart Mill introduced ‘laissez-faire’, it would take its 
place as a key term connoting the   Anglo Saxon and Anglo American 
approaches to economics and society.    
   The epoch of laissez-faire is typically traced from the early 19th 
century until its demise either at the start of World War One, or with the 
stock market crash in 1929.  In his famous 1919 essay, “The End of Laissez-
Faire,”  John Maynard Keynes traced this epoch’s demise to world war one 
and the misplaced Versailles Peace Treaty.  The bad years following 
Versailles, of which Keynes so righteously warned, were fraught by 
instability and economic decline, coupled with the rise of Bolshevism and 
the rise of Fascism along with Nation Socialism: programs designed to offer 
economic and social stability to regions of the world turn asunder by the 
demise of laissez-faire.  In the wake of world war two, ideas Keynes had 
advanced in his The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money 
(1936) stressed the importance of effective demand and the role it could play 
in offering economic stability by increasing levels of employment and 
output.   The Keynesian epoch proved a favorable epoch as it was associated 
with a post world war two recovery, generating a broadly shared world 
expansion often referred to as the ‘Golden Era of Economic Growth’.    
Neoliberalism would challenge and ostensibly replace Keynesian 
demand management starting with the so-called Reagan Revolution of the 
1980s that also found its way as what is described as the ‘Washington 
Consensus’ influencing policy at multilateral institutions such as the 
International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development.  
 Neoliberalism would finds its roots in doctrines of Classical 
Liberalism described as laissez-faire.  It is important to keep in mind that 
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Classical Liberalism was based on freeing economic activity from control of  
French monarchies, especially.  What exactly neoliberalism is freeing us 
from is less obvious.  At the surface level, neoliberalism promotes policies 
that free us from Keynesianism, and the related rise of Keynesian states and 
their ‘big govment’, as voiced by the marginally literate.   
However, a closer examination suggests Keynesian styled states and 
their demand management have not diminished in importance.   A social 
consensus for bettering the lot of a nation’s population through 
Keynesianism policies appears out of fashion.  There is, however, at least on 
the part of vested interests,  a consensus to rely on military spending to raise 
the levels of employment and output higher than what the neoliberal 
economy would warrant.   Thus this current epoch of neoliberalsm, might be 
better defined as the era of a deteriorated, misdirected, and misused form of 
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 Footnote    
1.  It is broadly accepted that Michaeal Kalekci introduced an understanding 
of ‘Military Keynesianism’ in his inquiry into the recovery of the Germany 
economy under the National Socialists in the 1930s.  The purpose of this 
paper is not to undertake an exhaustive study of Military Keynesianism, but 
we would like to note a recent and popular presentation of Military 
Keynesianism described by the eminent political scientist, Chalmers Johnson 
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